$11.8 billion dollars a year in tax money and airfare fees.
Since they were formed in November 2001, they’ve never stopped a terrorist plot, never prevented an airport attack, and never prevented an attacker from getting on an airplane. So literally everything they’ve ever taken in their two decades, including their budget, has been useless.
yeah but 11.8 billion dollars is useful. We’re talking about the useless act they put on wherein they steal our useless stuff for 11.8 Billion dollars.
Hmm, I interpreted “most useless” as applying to “confiscated” (as in, what is the thing that airport security most uselessly confiscated), but you’re right that it could modify “thing” (as in, what is the thing that was most useless which airport security confiscated). I think your way might be more grammatically correct, but I have heard both intended meanings in conversation.
Probably not. Before 2001, airport security screening was performed by privately-contracted security firms at each airport. The no-fly list (then called “no transport”) already existed and was maintained by the FAA in association with the FBI. There were still metal detectors and other elements of basic security screening which handled almost every reasonable threat, with one notable exception of course.
But the security vulnerabilities that were identified on 9/11–the hijackers’ ability to get small blades and pepper spray onto the plane, and the unlocked cockpit doors–were already patched by those private security agencies and by the FAA when air travel resumed on September 13. While better communication between those agencies, the airlines, the airports, the FAA, and the FBI was something that was sorely needed, establishing the TSA was far from the only way to do that; and putting them directly in charge of security at every airport was absolutely unnecessary.
But overall the threat of force is not an effective deterrent, especially for terrorism. When you think about it, those terrorists were planning to die on the plane; what do they care that the TSA threatened force against them? Any threat that they’d be stopped would only have changed their plans, not eliminated them.
Actually, all of the meaningful parts of the TSA (the security checkpoints with basic metal detectors, the no-fly list, and the in-flight security) were already in place before the TSA was established; they were just performed by independent security firms (contracted by each airport), by the FAA, and by the FBI.
Further, security and screening of almost every kind has a bias toward the attack vector of the most recent attack; it sucks across the board at coming up with new possible vectors. That means that, if the TSA had been in operation two months earlier, they likely wouldn’t have caught the terrorists’ weapons either (small blades and pepper spray), because they didn’t know to look for them then either.
The only reason that the TSA might’ve caught the September 11 hijackers is that the FBI and CIA individually had intelligence that, if put together, could’ve identified the hijackers early and added them to the FAA’s no-fly list; and the TSA might have facilitated better communication between those agencies.
Which means that the only arguable benefit that the TSA has brought to transportation security in America is coordination and standardization between entities and across airports throughout the US–which isn’t explicitly a part of the TSA’s mandate and could’ve been accomplished by a computer network.
There is actually an entire industry focused on testing security measures to ensure they work. It is called penetration testing. For something like the TSA, they’ll do audits where test passengers are sent through with contraband. Sort of like secret shoppers who evaluate a retail store by pretending to shop there. In one particular audit, they only successfully caught 3 out of 70. Some audits estimate a 95% failure rate.
The audits have consistently found that TSA’s catch rates are lower than random searches, by a wide margin. As in, they’d be better off not searching everyone, and just doing randomized searches on ~10-15% of passengers. That random “10-15% of passengers get a full search” system would catch more than the current “search everyone but miss 95% of contraband” system.
They could literally just roll a d8 die for each passenger in the line, and on a 1 they initiate a full search. And that would be more effective than their current methods.
Here is a write-up about one of the old 2015 audits. And here is one from 2017. And it’s worth noting that new audit results aren’t readily available, because the TSA started classifying their results around 2017 instead of releasing the numbers, when David Pekoske was installed as administrator. Because that definitely screams “our numbers are improving!”
Basically, a thorough search of 10-15% of passengers would more accurately catch threats, when compared to searching everyone with a ~95% miss rate. There are even systems designed to randomly select people for searches. Usually used in jobs where employees are subject to searches/drug tests as they’re arriving/leaving. For instance, if a company needs to drug test 5% of their employees every day, they can set their random selector to ping on 5% of people as they’re arriving.
They’re usually triggered automatically by walking across a mat, by employees badging through a controlled access door, or via a button push as security buzzes you in. But it could also be configured to be triggered based on something like ticket scans for passengers. Passengers get their ticket scanned, the random selector system randomly selects the pre-programmed percentage of passengers, and they’re the only ones who get pulled aside. All the rest are free to continue to their gate as usual. That way there are no accusations of random searches being discriminatory, because the random selector system is doing the choosing based on the defined percentage.
$11.8 billion dollars a year in tax money and airfare fees.
Since they were formed in November 2001, they’ve never stopped a terrorist plot, never prevented an airport attack, and never prevented an attacker from getting on an airplane. So literally everything they’ve ever taken in their two decades, including their budget, has been useless.
yeah but 11.8 billion dollars is useful. We’re talking about the useless act they put on wherein they steal our useless stuff for 11.8 Billion dollars.
Hmm, I interpreted “most useless” as applying to “confiscated” (as in, what is the thing that airport security most uselessly confiscated), but you’re right that it could modify “thing” (as in, what is the thing that was most useless which airport security confiscated). I think your way might be more grammatically correct, but I have heard both intended meanings in conversation.
Interesting ambiguity.
Would we know if they stopped a plot? Would it not at least be an imperfect deterrent for those considering but deciding against it?
Probably not. Before 2001, airport security screening was performed by privately-contracted security firms at each airport. The no-fly list (then called “no transport”) already existed and was maintained by the FAA in association with the FBI. There were still metal detectors and other elements of basic security screening which handled almost every reasonable threat, with one notable exception of course.
But the security vulnerabilities that were identified on 9/11–the hijackers’ ability to get small blades and pepper spray onto the plane, and the unlocked cockpit doors–were already patched by those private security agencies and by the FAA when air travel resumed on September 13. While better communication between those agencies, the airlines, the airports, the FAA, and the FBI was something that was sorely needed, establishing the TSA was far from the only way to do that; and putting them directly in charge of security at every airport was absolutely unnecessary.
But overall the threat of force is not an effective deterrent, especially for terrorism. When you think about it, those terrorists were planning to die on the plane; what do they care that the TSA threatened force against them? Any threat that they’d be stopped would only have changed their plans, not eliminated them.
If the TSA had ever prevented a terrorist plot you can be sure they’d be screaming about it at every opportunity.
You can never know.
Actually, all of the meaningful parts of the TSA (the security checkpoints with basic metal detectors, the no-fly list, and the in-flight security) were already in place before the TSA was established; they were just performed by independent security firms (contracted by each airport), by the FAA, and by the FBI.
Further, security and screening of almost every kind has a bias toward the attack vector of the most recent attack; it sucks across the board at coming up with new possible vectors. That means that, if the TSA had been in operation two months earlier, they likely wouldn’t have caught the terrorists’ weapons either (small blades and pepper spray), because they didn’t know to look for them then either.
The only reason that the TSA might’ve caught the September 11 hijackers is that the FBI and CIA individually had intelligence that, if put together, could’ve identified the hijackers early and added them to the FAA’s no-fly list; and the TSA might have facilitated better communication between those agencies.
Which means that the only arguable benefit that the TSA has brought to transportation security in America is coordination and standardization between entities and across airports throughout the US–which isn’t explicitly a part of the TSA’s mandate and could’ve been accomplished by a computer network.
Presumably airport security cost something (whether funded by fares or taxes) before the TSA - do we know how it compares?
There is actually an entire industry focused on testing security measures to ensure they work. It is called penetration testing. For something like the TSA, they’ll do audits where test passengers are sent through with contraband. Sort of like secret shoppers who evaluate a retail store by pretending to shop there. In one particular audit, they only successfully caught 3 out of 70. Some audits estimate a 95% failure rate.
The audits have consistently found that TSA’s catch rates are lower than random searches, by a wide margin. As in, they’d be better off not searching everyone, and just doing randomized searches on ~10-15% of passengers. That random “10-15% of passengers get a full search” system would catch more than the current “search everyone but miss 95% of contraband” system.
They could literally just roll a d8 die for each passenger in the line, and on a 1 they initiate a full search. And that would be more effective than their current methods.
Sorry, but that doesn’t sound even remotely realistic. Source?
Here is a write-up about one of the old 2015 audits. And here is one from 2017. And it’s worth noting that new audit results aren’t readily available, because the TSA started classifying their results around 2017 instead of releasing the numbers, when David Pekoske was installed as administrator. Because that definitely screams “our numbers are improving!”
Basically, a thorough search of 10-15% of passengers would more accurately catch threats, when compared to searching everyone with a ~95% miss rate. There are even systems designed to randomly select people for searches. Usually used in jobs where employees are subject to searches/drug tests as they’re arriving/leaving. For instance, if a company needs to drug test 5% of their employees every day, they can set their random selector to ping on 5% of people as they’re arriving.
They’re usually triggered automatically by walking across a mat, by employees badging through a controlled access door, or via a button push as security buzzes you in. But it could also be configured to be triggered based on something like ticket scans for passengers. Passengers get their ticket scanned, the random selector system randomly selects the pre-programmed percentage of passengers, and they’re the only ones who get pulled aside. All the rest are free to continue to their gate as usual. That way there are no accusations of random searches being discriminatory, because the random selector system is doing the choosing based on the defined percentage.
Fine