It’s really tough to hear you imply I’m not reading the things I post when I made reference to the same p40 model fact earlier today.

In that same page, on the bottom row the same column that had the p40 comment referenced recently added support for the snapdragon 8 elite.

On the unlocked devices support matrix (they become unlocked devices once brute forced) support for the dimensity 9400 is referenced.

Those are both chips used in q4 ‘24 and forward phones and the cop hardware brute forces and extracts them in February of ‘25. That’s not ancient at that time by any measure and not even ancient by the standards of today.

On that same page support for private space and 2nd space are referenced (those are the name for containers that harmony and hyper use) indicating support for extracting and decrypting harmonyos and hyperos containers indicating support for cracking harmonyos and hyperos. I pointed this out earlier today.

The fact that older devices have notes on them does not mean newer devices are not supported.

We are indeed going in circles.

Okay, to address just the request for proof that the security order is graphene, stock pixel then everything else, look at the 2025 link I posted, table 2, android access support matrix - locked devices:

Huawei - cold and hot brute force extraction at least partially supported

Pixel - second column of both cold and hot sections, brute force password to decrypt user ce and brute force password are marked not supported.

Xiaomi - bottom row, hot and cold extraction and brute forcing supported.

So there you go, pixel over xiaomi and huawei. If you need proof that graphene is at the top, compare the standard android and graphene columns in table 3: android os access support matrix - google pixel in the same most recent link.

I understand that you’re saying something else may be out there. You’re right, unknown security vulnerabilities might be around that have serious effects on non Chinese phones.

Im saying there are security vulnerabilities in the hands of police which are least effective against iphones, pixels and graphene and that it’s best to choose devices based on what you know as opposed to what you assume.

It really seems to me like I’m posting exactly what you say you need to see over and over again, what am I missing?

So we don’t have access to the most up to date information on the most recent iteration of cop hardware and software for breaking into phones.

If either one of us did, it would be a very bad idea to say that we were basing our argumentation on that.

Based instead on historical data points, like the ones I’ve provided, we can consistently see that at those points in time the latest stock pixel and iphone devices were preferable to anything else including the latest huawei and xiaomi devices for the purposes of avoiding cop access.

The reason I’ve been engaging with your argument that the latest xiaomi/huawei stuff is preferable to the pixel/iphone equivalent is that I’m concerned someone worried about cops might make a decision about how to use their limited resources based on that argument.

They’re not bad phones or bad companies and China isn’t a bad country. There’s just real world evidence that the devices aren’t as secure as some alternatives.

My whole point separate of yours (that I’m paraphrasing here, apologies) that devices made outside the amerisraeli apparatus are inherently safer is that we need to pay attention to the wealth of information about phone security rather than base our decisions on assumptions.

Heres yet another data point to go by, in this case presented as a blog analysis of the 2025 leak (only a little over a year old at this point!). there’s a million great bits of knowledge in that page if you’re interested in learning a ton about android security but the long and short of it for android devices is about the same as before: graphene is at the top, then stock pixel then literally everything else.

The point of using the company claims from 2021 and the famous leak from 2024 was to establish a pattern, not to suggest that information from that long ago could be applied directly to this present moment.

The pattern is: android devices and old iphones and pixels that need to be updated are vulnerable no matter the country and alliances.

It can be established because the company’s claims forever were “we can do this” and finally there was a leak showing in pretty good detail that they weren’t lying.

here is the entire pdf of the leaked android support matrix linked in the article I linked to above. It only goes model by model for pixels, partly because it’s illustrating their capabilities against graphene as opposed to stock android but likely also because there’s thousands of android phones and a model/os version matrix would be insane and have an endnotes page a mile long.

Page 3: supported extraction listed for android devices by chipset includes huaweis ostensibly non amerisraeli hardware stack. Secured container extraction supported for both huawei and xiaomi implementations present in harmonyos and hyperos.

Page 4: huawei and xiaomi devices listed as brute force able in both on and off device states (there are notably some exceptions here, some qualcomm chipsets take a day and the p40 phones with their software updates weren’t brute forceable).

Page 5: huawei and xiaomi, realme, oppo, oneplus and zte are listed as brute forceable in off and on states.

here’s the same thing but for ios. I’m tired and it gives much more precise detail on a narrower range of devices, so I’ll just summarize:

Six year old iphones running a month old os version were safe from even “after first unlock” (the most unsafe locked state) compromise.

some phones running the one and a half year old ios in a “before first unlock” state (the most secure locked state) were subject to a brute forcer that was limited to 5000 attempts per day. That sounds like a lot, but a six digit pin would need constant hammering for 200 straight days. Not unheard of but a very far cry from the “plug it up, get access” that is advertised, documented in many security outlets and something I have literally observed happening inside a cop car at a protest.

So to summarize: as of two years ago, the ostensibly non amerisraeli tech stack was not secure against the cops. Harmonyos and hyperos were not secure against the cops. Out of date ios and pixel phones were also not secure.

I want to make clear that what is explicitly shown with regard to pixels and iphones is definitley true of all device families: the newest stuff has fewer vulnerabilities because people just haven’t been pounding on it as much.

Again, this is intended to help people to make good choices using real world information as opposed to predictions. If I were buying a phone to resist the cops, it would be an iphone or a pixel with graphene.

Apologies for the late reply, sometimes I’m not in a good spot to chase down leaks about cop shit.

As of at least 2021 cellebrite claims they have the ability to access xiaomi and huawei devices, listing explicitly the soc and baseband chips used by the very phones you are claiming are safe because of their lack of amerisraieli death pact ties.

A famous leak of their support matrix from 2024 confirms this and also explicitly groups android devices by their soc/baseband chips. Reenforcing that the chips ostensibly with no ties to the amerisraeli death cult are not any more secure or private than ones with those ties.

The point of those is to quickly draw a line that connects the past to the present. We see the same claims, then the affirmation of those claims reported by a third party.

I think in a vacuum, assuming perfectly spherical semiconductor manufacturing industries and leaving software out of the picture, the point you’re trying to make is the most materialist take: you can’t trust the imperialists tech, the masters tools cannot be used to tear down the plantation, etc.

In our present day with a hundred years plus of semiconductor manufacturing history encompassing real countries whose attitudes towards one another and development have changed significantly during that span, given reliable information about the explicit capacities western (and lest be serious here, any) le or intelligence apparatus has, the most materialist take is that there’s more to the choice of what device to trust than where the chips come from.

To butcher a car metaphor, what you’re saying is similar to people claiming buying and driving a Tesla is better than a BYD because you can’t trust Chinese tech. That idea might be fine (or chauvinist) in a bubble but when we can evaluate the Tesla and BYD for ourselves in a parking lot or on the road we might come away with wildly different ideas.

Technology has to be evaluated based on its capabilities and how it’s being used when that’s possible and I would argue it’s extremely possible in the case of security in phones and that if you think you’re gonna be scooped by the cops you need to be on graphene, the latest ios or maybe a pixel with the latest android.

From cellebrite’s own documentation (on the first page, of a sales pdf, which was the second or third google result):

Supported devices include Huawei H1611, Xiaomi Mi 5, ZTE Z832 Sonata 3 and ZTE Z981 ZMax Pro

I’m, again, not as familiar with huawei and xiaomi product lines and whatnot as I am with the iphones and pixels so I can’t speak to the popularity of specific ones implicated in just that bullet point and the doc I quoted from is at least seven years old, however I do know that many more chinese devices are accessible with these cop metasploit tools.

The idea that backdoors can be grouped by what nation state intelligence apparatus has control over the manufacturing of the device in question is good reasoning when we have no other information to go off of. In this case though, there is a wealth of information public, leaked and from people who just can’t help but warthunder their classified documents in fights online.

I would never suggest American/israeli tech power should be accepted as a net positive or reasonable compromise. What I want is for people to critically and carefully consider the devices they trust based on what we know about intelligence apparatuses ability to compromise them as opposed to the fog of information war.

I mean, if your goal is to make people as safe from the police as possible as simply as possible then the cellebrite and graphite leaks would steer you towards the last few generations of pixels and any iphone that can get the latest os.

That’s not to say graphene isn’t a fantastic choice, I use it daily and it’s secure from law enforcement hardware, just that the leaked capability matrixes consistently indicate that cops can’t break into appropriately secured iphones and specific android phones as well.

Which is really useful knowledge to have and build your behaviors around that would be completely missed if someone were to base their choice of device around what doesn’t have Israeli connections first.

That’s a pretty recent change, but I take your point that chip manufacturing with no ties to Israel may exist.

To the main point, while it could be a good idea in theory to avoid devices with chips tied to Israel and the us, in practice that would lead people away from iphones and pixels that do best against graphite and cellebrite which would be bad.

You have a bunch of answers including one you chose, but you can always rebind the tmux key to something compatible with your terminals search and use [key] - d to disconnect from your tmux session then invoke it with tmux attach-session to get back into your session.

on attach it should clear the screen, print the stdout buffer it accumulated and give me stdin prompt, that’s it

The last part of the above, disconnecting from tmux and reattaching would do what you described. That may be useful if you need to work with tmux.

Huawei famously ran an Israel office for a long time, idk about xiaomi but smic usually works in nations they’re sanctioned in through shells like (at least in the past) Israel microwave company.

The point isn’t to find the one pure company but to recognize the reality of semiconductor manufacturing and development at this moment being insanely integrated across every imaginable border and take a more nuanced and serious view of the impact a chip could have on your life than “chip tied to Israel, chip and stuff it’s in bad”

That’s not to say your replies could be reasonably distilled down to that mischaracterization, just that I’m hoping people come away thinking they should think of more than weather something has a tie to the bad country.

I don’t know of any modern soc type semiconductor manufacturer without some Israeli connection at least on the level of what’s described in this article “ cooperation with engineers from … development center in Israel”.

Open to being wrong here but I think even manufacturers of non-soc ics like op amps and ttl and discrete components like transistors and diodes have this degree of connection (I’m thinking specifically of onsemi who make all the Fairchild stuff here!)

The headline is more than a little misleading.

Alongside the main processor, the iPhone 17e includes two critical developments by Apple’s silicon teams: The N1 wireless connectivity chip and the C1X cellular modem. These two chips, designed to grant Apple technological independence vis-à-vis external suppliers, were developed in close cooperation with engineers from Apple’s development center in Israel.

It’s not an Israeli chip any more than other chips designed by companies with engineering groups in Israel are.

Which is all of the phone, tablet, laptop and whatever socs and cpus iirc.

It’s also not clear which chip the headline is talking about, so maybe not one to take seriously…

Fifteen years or so. I been using it for at least five of those.

I don’t know about their app, how well they evade blocks or anything like that. It’s 2-3$ a month and only used for port forwarding.

Air has openvpn and port forwarding and is cheap.

What I’m trying to communicate is that in the case of an ai profitability crash or even just the v and a series gpus getting dropped from cuda support (they’re next on the chopping block!) you will suddenly be the slow guy.

People raw dogging the internet aren’t the ones you have to outrun because even twenty years ago there wasn’t a real investigation, they just immediately got prosecuted. In your metaphor they all get caught in camp asleep, you’re running a race against me but you’re wearing cinder blocks for shoes.

It’s <$20 to get a freshtomato or openwrt compatible consumer router from the thrift shop and switch to wg.

My point isn’t to argue or to fight, but to gently inform that you’re maybe missing a crucial piece of the picture and offer a solution. 😘

You may want to migrate away from openvpn with hardware acceleration. It’s my understanding that the type of hardware built to accelerate openvpn uses older crypto processes that are not hardened against parallelization or quantum.

Quantum is fake but parallelization is absolutely not and once it becomes more profitable to pop hashes than to do erp with racks of dgxs people are gonna do it.

You made the accusation of vote manipulation twice, stand on your business or shut up.

Report it

Good job. You should be proud of yourself for making this post.