The only good thing is that end-to-end encrypted messaging services such as Signal are temporarily safe. However, this law fundamentally threatens encryption and citizen safety. There is something you can do about that:
The only good thing is that end-to-end encrypted messaging services such as Signal are temporarily safe. However, this law fundamentally threatens encryption and citizen safety. There is something you can do about that:
Ok, sorry, I see it was /u/gratux@lemmy.blahaj.zone who said it. I often lose track when people jump into conversation like that…
You’re mostly right, my whole point is that it’s more nuanced than “they will scan everything”. People like gratux simplify it, post exaggerated claims, it spreads and then everyone who thinks they know something posts “EU Is A SurvEillAnCe StAte!!!1”.
Reading Chat Control 2.0 I see a measured response to a problem. They want to fight grooming and sharing of CSAM. How can you do it? The least invasive way is to identify services where grooming and sharing of CSAM happens and then, if the risk is high, separate children from adults (age verification) and scan media client side. That really is the least they can do. Now, we can argue if grooming and CSAM is a real problem and if EU should be trying to address it (I would argue it’s not. parents should be monitoring their kids, not EU and police has tools to fight CSAM without client side scanning) but it’s definitely not an attempt to break e2e encryption and monitor all communications.
If EU is trying to introduce mass surveillance like that then they are doing shit job. Most people would be completely fine with WhatsApp scanning their media, they already post everything on Instagram. WhatpsApp actually doesn’t want to scan anything because it’s extra work for them with no gains. People who worry about those things use Signal of Matrix. Most of them would disable media sharing as a last resort. No one is going to read our text messages or decrypt our files.
I don’t think we need to argue that. It is a real problem. It’s more that measures like this, aren’t likely to be particularly effective in combatting CSA. It’s not for nothing that many digital rights organizations like the EDRi and EFF are advocating against this. Even child protection services aren’t necessarily in favour of this. This proposal does little to actually help the victims of CSA (even more so because of the exclusions of software that isn’t publically available).
That leaves the question, who does it benefit?
Agreed!
Maybe not explicitly, but it sure makes it easier.
Thanks to the EP. I agree that CC2.0 has lost a lot of its teeth due to the exclusion of explicit mandatory scanning (though it’s still problematic). Before those changes, it was absolutely mass surveillance imo. Currently, I’d say it’s more of a stepping stone.
Most people don’t seem to care about privacy in general unfortunately, though posts on instagram are not the same as WhatsApp messages and the like.
I kinda doubt that. Meta already has those tools.
I obviously meant it as “we can argue if it’s sufficiently widespread and common problem to mandate this type of legislation from EU”. And by “this type” I mean fairly measured. And I would argue it’s not. If we agree that it its actually very harmful and EU should do whatever it can to stop it than I think we will eventually agree that we should do age verification and client side scanning as the best privacy preserving options.
Ok, let’s stop here. This link read like total bull shit. They claim that tech corporation spread some misinformation to support Chat Control 2.0 and then say that (if I understand this correctly) the right solution is:
This is fucking Chat Control 2.0! Half of the legislation talks about “Security by Design” and preventing grooming. They want strong default that will shield children, periodic evaluation and forced mitigation for companies that fail to adapt proper measures. The second half is about takedown obligations. What is going on here? The only difference is that Chat Control also want’s to stop spreading of CSAM because there’s a lot of it that already exists so clearly preventing it’s creation will not be sufficient. So they say “no, let’s not do Chat Control 2.0! Let’s do Chat Control 2.0 but let’s also ignore part of the problem we don’t know how to solve”.
Yes, EP is working on it, negotiating and looking for the right solution. So far it didn’t find one so nothing was passed. Why do people claim they are looking to introduce mass surveillance when they clearly don’t? And don’t get me wrong, I’m sure intelligence services and police would love for EP to break encryption. It would make their jobs so much easier. I’m sure there are forces inside EU that push for this but it’s definitely not the agenda of EU as a whole, not even close.
With Chat Control 1.0 it was legal to scan messages for 5 years already. Why no one is doing this? Because they already have the info they need and scanning memes that people send to each other is not valuable enough for them.
Well, the idea is that if the creation is prevented, the spreading will solve itself. Chat Control 2.0 also isn’t judicially targeted. And to be clear, that summary is based on what the EP is advocating for (and is, I believe, part of the basis for amendments in the earlier document you linked).
Btw, there are 2 links in my post. The 1st one is more interesting in my opinion.
Because the initial proposals from the Council and Commission more or less were mass surveillance. Only after a couple of years has it done away with the mandatory scanning (for now anyway) after it became clear the EP wouldn’t be in favour (again). People are understandably suspicious. Unfortunately, people tend to conflate the entire EU into one thing, in large part because reporting tends to just say “EU”. The EP certainly isn’t looking to introduce mass surveillance, that much should be clear by now.
Why do you say no one is doing this? Big Tech isn’t advocating for the continuation of (the temporary) CC1.0 because they’re not using it.
Ok, the links are next to each other so they look like one. So the other one talks about connections to AI companies that would sell tech used by Chat Control 2.0. This is kind of obvious. EU is not immune to lobbying and different companies are involved in pretty much everything it does. How much influence they have is a separate issue.
You will not prevent creation with “stronger defaults”. Not all CSAM is created online. AI is/will be new source of it that will not be stopped by Chat Control. A lot of CSAM already exists. So the idea that just by preventing grooming we will stop all CSAM is silly, we will only stop some of it. So what can actually be done about using e2e encrypted apps to share CSAM? I see two options: do nothing or scan client side. What other options are there? Besides breaking e2ee obviously. So at this point I see it as EP saying “let’s include it in the solution” and privacy activists saying “no, let’s ignore it”.
Agree. Sadly people don’t understand what happened and the conversation got stuck. People are still opposing something that is no longer on the table instead of thinking about real solutions. This is bad because it’s not bringing us closer to a compromise. It just helps to spread misinformation and weakens EU as a whole.
I was appreciating what you added to the conversation at first, but man… giving a bad faith one line response to a long, well thought out comment, now being unable to admit a mistake without passive aggressively implying it’s the others person’s fault you didn’t read thoroughly…
I guess I do appreciate knowing who to block before I need to personally interact with them.
That was a very valuable addition to this this conversation, thanks.
It will be great a loss to be blocked by you. Not.