The only good thing is that end-to-end encrypted messaging services such as Signal are temporarily safe. However, this law fundamentally threatens encryption and citizen safety. There is something you can do about that:

https://fightchatcontrol.eu/

  • ReluctantZen@feddit.nlEnglish
    3·
    2 hours ago

    You said:

    I did not. I responded to the comment that said that. I said that they kept bringing CC2.0 back.

    I did also say that it’s specifically about scanning, but that’s indeed not entirely accurate. That’s part of it, but it’s broader than that.

    but it’s still just client side scanning, not breaking encryption

    Not sure what you mean by “still just”. Client side scanning just sidesteps encryption, making the encryption useless. It’s like saying “we’ll never open your posted letters in transit, but we’ll look over your shoulder while you write/read it”.

    Services that are not likely to be used to share CSAM will not be forced to mitigate anything.

    Sure, but chat apps are pretty likely, no? And authorities are allowed to adjust the risk assessments.

    Another mitigation could simply be disabling sharing of media - text messages will not have to scanned

    I mean, sure, but that doesn’t seem like a feasible solution. People’d just leave that platform. Imagine if WhatsApp blocked sending images or files.

    So we’re basically talking about checking hashes of shared media against some database in some of the services

    This wouldn’t catch new CSAM though (thus not protecting children).

    • ExLisper@lemmy.curiana.netEnglish
      12·
      1 hour ago

      Ok, sorry, I see it was /u/gratux@lemmy.blahaj.zone who said it. I often lose track when people jump into conversation like that…

      You’re mostly right, my whole point is that it’s more nuanced than “they will scan everything”. People like gratux simplify it, post exaggerated claims, it spreads and then everyone who thinks they know something posts “EU Is A SurvEillAnCe StAte!!!1”.

      Reading Chat Control 2.0 I see a measured response to a problem. They want to fight grooming and sharing of CSAM. How can you do it? The least invasive way is to identify services where grooming and sharing of CSAM happens and then, if the risk is high, separate children from adults (age verification) and scan media client side. That really is the least they can do. Now, we can argue if grooming and CSAM is a real problem and if EU should be trying to address it (I would argue it’s not. parents should be monitoring their kids, not EU and police has tools to fight CSAM without client side scanning) but it’s definitely not an attempt to break e2e encryption and monitor all communications.

      If EU is trying to introduce mass surveillance like that then they are doing shit job. Most people would be completely fine with WhatsApp scanning their media, they already post everything on Instagram. WhatpsApp actually doesn’t want to scan anything because it’s extra work for them with no gains. People who worry about those things use Signal of Matrix. Most of them would disable media sharing as a last resort. No one is going to read our text messages or decrypt our files.

      • huey_m@piefed.socialEnglish
        0·
        38 minutes ago

        I often lose track when people jump into conversation like that…

        I was appreciating what you added to the conversation at first, but man… giving a bad faith one line response to a long, well thought out comment, now being unable to admit a mistake without passive aggressively implying it’s the others person’s fault you didn’t read thoroughly…

        I guess I do appreciate knowing who to block before I need to personally interact with them.

        • ExLisper@lemmy.curiana.netEnglish
          1·
          41 minutes ago

          That was a very valuable addition to this this conversation, thanks.

          It will be great a loss to be blocked by you. Not.

      • ReluctantZen@feddit.nlEnglish
        0·
        28 minutes ago

        we can argue if grooming and CSAM is a real problem

        I don’t think we need to argue that. It is a real problem. It’s more that measures like this, aren’t likely to be particularly effective in combatting CSA. It’s not for nothing that many digital rights organizations like the EDRi and EFF are advocating against this. Even child protection services aren’t necessarily in favour of this. This proposal does little to actually help the victims of CSA (even more so because of the exclusions of software that isn’t publically available).

        That leaves the question, who does it benefit?

        parents should be monitoring their kids, not EU and police has tools to fight CSAM without client side scanning

        Agreed!

        it’s definitely not an attempt to break e2e encryption and monitor all communications.

        Maybe not explicitly, but it sure makes it easier.

        If EU is trying to introduce mass surveillance like that then they are doing shit job

        Thanks to the EP. I agree that CC2.0 has lost a lot of its teeth due to the exclusion of explicit mandatory scanning (though it’s still problematic). Before those changes, it was absolutely mass surveillance imo. Currently, I’d say it’s more of a stepping stone.

        Most people would be completely fine with WhatsApp scanning their media, they already post everything on Instagram

        Most people don’t seem to care about privacy in general unfortunately, though posts on instagram are not the same as WhatsApp messages and the like.

        WhatpsApp actually doesn’t want to scan anything because it’s extra work for them with no gains

        I kinda doubt that. Meta already has those tools.

        • ExLisper@lemmy.curiana.netEnglish
          1·
          4 minutes ago

          I don’t think we need to argue that.

          I obviously meat it as “we can argue if it’s sufficiently widespread and common problem to mandate this type of legislation for EU”. And by “this type” I mean fairly measured. And I would argue it’s not. If we agree that it its actually very harmful and EU should do whatever it can to stop it than I think we will eventually agree that we should do age verification and client side scanning as the best privacy preserving options.

          That leaves the question, who does it benefit?

          Ok, let’s stop here. This link read like total bull shit. They claim that tech corporation spread some misinformation to support Chat Control 2.0 and then say that (if I understand this correctly) the right solution is:

          Strict default settings and protective mechanisms (Security by Design) to make cybergrooming technically harder from the outset and prevent the creation of CSAM.
Targeted telecommunications surveillance based on judicially confirmed suspicion.
Proactive search by a new EU Center and immediate takedown obligations for providers and law enforcement on the open internet and darknet — removing illegal material at source.

          This is fucking Chat Control 2.0! Half of the legislation talks about “Security by Design” and preventing grooming. They want strong default that will shield children, periodic evaluation and forced mitigation for companies that fail to adapt proper measures. The second half is about takedown obligations. What is going on here? The only difference is that Chat Control also want’s to stop spreading of CSAM because there’s a lot of it that already exists so clearly preventing it’s creation will not be sufficient. So they say “no, let’s not do Chat Control 2.0! Let’s do Chat Control 2.0 but let’s also ignore part of the problem we don’t know how to solve”.

          Thanks to the EP. I agree that CC2.0 has lost a lot of its teeth due to the exclusion of explicit mandatory scanning

          Yes, EP is working on it, negotiating and looking for the right solution. So far it didn’t find one so nothing was passed. Why do people claim they are looking to introduce mass surveillance when they clearly don’t? And don’t get me wrong, I’m sure intelligence services and police would love for EP to break encryption. It would make their jobs so much easier. I’m sure there are forces inside EU that push for this but it’s definitely not the agenda of EU as a whole, not even close.

          I kinda doubt that. Meta already has those tools.

          With Chat Control 1.0 it was legal to scan messages for 5 years already. Why no one is doing this? Because they already have the info they need and scanning memes that people send to each other is not valuable enough for them.