Gaining ground isn’t the same thing as winning, a lesson that the Russians should be all too familiar with, as it’s how they beat the Germans in WW2 (though a more accurate point of comparison would be Germany’s failure against the West in WW1; they held significant ground in France at the time of their surrender. It wasn’t that their lines collapsed or that they were outmanoeuvred on the battlefield; it was their economy that could no longer bear the weight of the war). It is, in fact, an extremely effective strategy to slowly cede ground at a cost that is too high for your aggressor to bear, and that’s exactly what Ukraine is doing to Russia. This doesn’t mean Ukraine is guaranteed to win, but their success largely depends on the continued support of their allies in Europe and North America. Whereas Russia has no real clear path to success at this point.
Russian doctrine relies on punching a hole, moving and exploiting that gap to create a salient and outmanoeuvre your enemy. Ukraine has gotten too good at entrenching, and is creating deeply layered defences that the Russians have no way to break through in a decisive fashion, and Ukraine is being extremely careful with it’s manpower, whereas Russian continues to waste theirs on pointless attacks and dispersed operations. We’re seeing constant footage and reports of Russian sections consisting of only 2-4 men attacking over open ground with no vehicle support, and getting picked off as they come in by Ukrainian machine gun positions and FPVs. The Russian economy is grinding to a halt under the weight of the war; they held out a lot longer in the face of sanctions than anyone in the West predicted, but the choices they made early on to keep the economy flowing are now turning into major pain points (massive interest rate hikes to control inflation now turning into a serious lack of investment and consumer spending, dumped foreign currency reserves used to float the rouble now leaving them with no fallback for the hard times ahead, etc). Ukraine has developed new long range attack drones that can strike deep into Russia, opening up all of their industry, and particularly their oil refining capabilities, to attack. Russia is so big that they simply cannot defend all of it from aerial attack, and Ukraine’s intel is good enough that they can continually shift their focus to wherever Russia isn’t defending.
This is why Putin is eager to talk peace now. He would love to, as you describe, stop with their current gains. That would actually constitute a win. The longer this goes on for, the worse it gets for Russia, while Ukraine can continue to hold out for as long as we continue to stand with them and keep them supplied. Their manpower losses are serious, but manageable if they continue with their current strategies, and while Russia continues to hammer their infrastructure, Ukraine has superior - and more efficient - air defence and most of their manufacturing happens outside of the country where Russia can’t hit it.
Ukraine has developed new long range attack drones that can strike deep into Russia, opening up all of their industry, and particularly their oil refining capabilities, to attack. Russia is so big that they simply cannot defend all of it from aerial attack, and Ukraine’s intel is good enough that they can continually shift their focus to wherever Russia isn’t defending.
It is especially delicious how Russia’s greatest advantage in this war - their size relative to Ukraine, hence significantly higher manpower and resources than Ukraine, as well as territorial depth that let them have important military facilities beyond the range of Ukraine, has been turned by Ukraine into one of Russia’s worst strategical weaknesses.
Anywhere in Ukraine can be hit by Russia, even with shitty shit drones like Shaheed, so Ukranians adapted, plus comparativelly to Russia their’s is a smaller country hence with fewer sites of strategical value, which means having enough AA to take down most of Russia’s missiles and long-range drones is actually possible, which is why Russia’s ever larger mass attacks of late have had so much less effect than smaller attacks did at the start of the Invasion.
Meanwhile Russia’s strategically important infrastructure is all over a large country, so they would have to deploy AA to defend every individual site and they don’t have enough of the kind of AA that can successfully deal with low-flying drones (it doesn’t matter how good their coverage with longer range systems like the S-500 is when that weapon system is not suitable to deal with Cessna-152s converted into drones flying at low altitude plus each missile costs many times more than each of those drones).
Russian doctrine relies on punching a hole, moving and exploiting that gap to create a salient and outmanoeuvre your enemy.
According to whom?
According to the actual battlefield, Russian doctrine relies on throwing wave after wave of poorly trained criminals and shanghaied DPR/LPR citizens into the machine guns, artillery and drones of the Ukrainians.
Don’t get me wrong, there are massive weaknesses, and we may see Ukraine exploit them. But we aren’t seeing that translate to battlefield success. Putin hasn’t shown any eagerness to talk peace; only the same old “peace” meaning capitulation. He’s been keen on that since the beginning.
Funnily enough, experts on Russian battlefield doctrine. The ones I talked to all work in the CAF, but you’re welcome to search up your own sources on the subject. This guy was the commander of the US armed forces in Europe from 2014 to 2017, so I’d say he probably knows his stuff, and his analysis aligns with that of the experts I’ve spoken with; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-qjrYpDDWS4&t=1s
If you’re trying to understand the disconnect between their doctrine and what’s actually playing out on the battlefield, it’s surprisingly simple really. This is what happens when you have an inflexible command structure that relies exclusively on doctrine and rigid adherence to chain of command (eg, individual soldiers are basically just machines to operated by their superiors), mixed with a huge amount of institutional corruption and an unwillingness to report the basic facts of the situation on the ground because it’s politically unfavourable to admit that things aren’t going to plan. The doctrine says “Smash a hole” so they try, and fail, repeatedly to smash that hole. That leads to waves of men being thrown at targets to no effect because if you haven’t smashed the hole you can’t move on to step two, so you just keep on repeating step one.
The Russian thirst for poorly trained conscripts cannot be adequately explained by corruption and poor reporting obscuring what’s actually happening. At some point you have to accept the possibility that Putin knows what’s happening and is ok with it.
Sure, it’s possible that Russia hasn’t changed its doctrine in 3 years, but it seems unlikely. Old doctrine is obsolete on a battlefield where all movements are immediately observed and armoured vehicles are more vulnerable due to a proliferation of anti tank weapons.
But throwing cannon fodder at the guns to reveal where they are, then shooting them with something else - that never stops working as long as you have cannon fodder.
I wonder if we’re just arguing over whether this strategy is something deserving of praise, with you thinking that, since I characterise the balance favouring Russia, I think this is strategic genius? In case of that, I don’t; it’s stupid and wasteful. But it’s also working in the sense that it’s gradually pushing Ukraine back.
The Russian thirst for poorly trained conscripts cannot be adequately explained by corruption and poor reporting obscuring what’s actually happening.
I’m really not sure why you feel this needs any further explanation. I’ve already covered how their doctrine is failing them, and it’s resulting in troops being pushed into the meat grinder instead. If you’re confused on some particular point, maybe try asking questions instead.
But throwing cannon fodder at the guns to reveal where they are, then shooting them with something else - that never stops working as long as you have cannon fodder.
75% of battlefield kills in Ukraine are made by explosive equipped FPV suicide drones. These can attack from any position and angle, and can loiter in an area for a long time, so the notion that they’re revealing the position of enemy guns with these attacks does not hold up to the reality on the battlefield. It may be the belief of some of the commanders that that’s what they’re doing, but if so, they’re wrong.
But it’s also working in the sense that it’s gradually pushing Ukraine back.
I covered this in my first reply in this conversation. If you’re going to repeat arguments that I’ve already countered, without offering any additional counterargument or support for your claim, then I might as well try to have a debate about quantum physics with a toddler.
I covered this in my first reply in this conversation.
What you specifically said was “It is, in fact, an extremely effective strategy to slowly cede ground at a cost that is too high for your aggressor to bear” but then ignored the fact that Russia seems extremely willing to bear the cost it is paying.
75% of battlefield kills in Ukraine are made by explosive equipped FPV suicide drones.
Most FPV drone kills are not first strikes against moving troops. They are more often used to to prevent recovery of a disabled vehicle or to finish off someone who’s wounded. There is a first-hand account of this here but if you’re following the war and think back to videos you’ve seen of FPV kills you’ll probably recognise this.
I’m really not sure why you feel this needs any further explanation.
Think of it this way then: if you can explain a phenomenon by a potential adversary as either a conscious choice or a blunder, attributing it to a blunder is risky, because you start to assume that party is incompetent.
Don’t forget the context: I replied to a comment saying that Russia could never threaten another country because it was struggling so much in Ukraine. I don’t mean that it’s “slowly winning” to mean, “I am very confident that, without other changes, Russia will win, but it will just take many years.” I mean that Russia is advancing, able to maintain an effective fighting force and remains a real threat.
There are very real reasons to think that Ukraine’s war against Russia’s oil economy will eventually provide the pressure away from the frontline that forces Russia to capitulate. But we can’t be at all confident of this; economic collapse has, as I mentioned before, been repeatedly predicted and has not yet come to pass. That doesn’t mean it won’t, but it means that confidence about Russia’s inability to threaten violence against other states is dangerously misplaced.
Ukraine’s economy is only able to maintain its effort due to massive support from its allies. But Russia has powerful allies too: it would be a foreign policy loss for China if Russia fails; China wants the same “spheres of influence” thinking that Putin does (and Trump does) to prevail internationally.
If you want to say that Russia’s slow battlefield progress is of little importance to the war in Ukraine I’d be inclined to agree with you, but if you want to stand by the original comment that Russia’s struggles in Ukraine indicate its threats must be toothless I hope I’ve explained why I disagree.
Thank you for clarifying. I think I have a better grasp of your argument now.
First, I’ll try to offer a clarification of my own; when I talk about Russia’s preference for rapid breakthrough operations, I’ve been using the term “doctrine” very specifically. What you’re describing is not doctrine, but strategy. Doctrine is neither strategy, nor tactics, but it informs and guides both. I don’t disagree that the current Russian strategy is one of disposable conscript assaults, but I suspect that strategy largely arises from the failures of their doctrine in the face of the realities of the conflict, and is not as deliberate a choice as you seem to think. I don’t think there’s really a way for either of us to be proven right here, as we’d need to be in the room with the Russian generals to say for sure.
Most FPV drone kills are not first strikes against moving troops. They are more often used to to prevent recovery of a disabled vehicle or to finish off someone who’s wounded.
I’ve read the linked account previously. It’s an excellent and informative read, but it’s value is deeply limited. Unfortunately, I can’t provide many of the countervailing sources that I have access to, because I’m working from direct conversations with people with significant expertise and first hand knowledge, as opposed to documentary sources. I get that that’s a claim anyone could make, and I’ll freely acknowledge that I have no way to back it up. Trust me or don’t, your call. But basically Jakub is speaking from a very limited, anecdotal view of the battlefield. His account may well be true for where he was stationed and what he was doing, but the broader statistics have shown that FPV drones have become the primary source of battlefield casualties, on both sides. This doesn’t mean they’re the primary mode of attack, per se, but they are the mode that is most consistent in creating casualties. This article from Kyiv Post covers it well, and while I don’t consider them an unbiased source, the statistics cited actually come directly from the Russian MOD, and I can’t see any value to them in lying about this; overstating the effectiveness of Ukraine’s drones would, if anything, make Russia look worse here. According to Russian figures only 20% of battlefield casualties are caused by artillery, and only 4% by small arms. This pretty directly contradicts the claims Jakub makes in his account. I think it also largely speaks to how the war has more or less become a stalemate. Attacks from both sides are limited; even the Russian “human waves” aren’t so much waves as very small groups of soldiers, as Gen. Ben Hodges describes in the video I linked earlier.
Don’t forget the context: I replied to a comment saying that Russia could never threaten another country because it was struggling so much in Ukraine. I don’t mean that it’s “slowly winning” to mean, “I am very confident that, without other changes, Russia will win, but it will just take many years.” I mean that Russia is advancing, able to maintain an effective fighting force and remains a real threat.
OK, so more broadly here, I think there’s actually a lot we agree on. Yes, it would be deeply foolish to see Russia as a paper tiger, and yes, regardless of where we differ on Russia’s state of play in Ukraine, the fact remains that they are certainly able to maintain an effective fighting force outside of that conflict, and would absolutely be able to prosecute additional limited conflicts (we’ll get to that in a moment) while maintaining their position in Ukraine. But there are reasons for that that I think undermine some of your argument.
Basically, the problem for Russia is that they’re not really able to fully commit to the war in Ukraine. This isn’t a “total war” for them, and Putin lacks the ability to convince the Russian public that it should be treated as one. That’s a key difference between Russia and Ukraine right now. The Ukrainian people will accept significant hardship if it means victory, because victory is the only path to survival. But for Russia, this war is Putin’s nation building project, and maybe a chance to flex a bit and show off their prowess on the world stage. The average Russian isn’t ideologically committed to the conflict, and isn’t about to accept, say, food rationing in order to win this fight. Thus, while it’s true that a significant portion of Russia’s overall military capability remains at their disposal, that’s because it is politically untenable for them to use it. Even their apparently endless manpower isn’t truly endless; conscription waves come at a significant cost, both in terms of political capital (Russian elections may be a fraud, but dictators still only rule because people allow them to, as many kings and tyrants have learned throughout history; Putin is a keen student of history and painfully aware of this fact), and in terms of the economic impact of sending a generation of young men to die in a war instead of allowing them to contribute to your workforce. These costs are growing unsustainable for Russia, and as Ukraine’s strikes on their gas refining capabilities continue to bite that will only grow worse.
While I agree that Russia could, in theory, commit significant resources to a wider conflict, there would need to be a reason for them to do so. This is why I say that Russia would have the ability to prosecute additional limited conflicts. That rules out almost every potential target they have at present; an invasion of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Poland, Turkey, or Japan would be a total war with all of NATO, and that’s a fight that they would lose. Without the ability to conjure up some existential threat that would make such a war seem completely necessary to the Russian people, there’s simply no way for Putin to move in that direction without facing down a full scale public revolt. Either in the short term or the long term it would guarantee the collapse of their government, either because NATO marches on Moscow or their own people do. I’m not saying this lightly; I have friends and loved ones who would likely be the very first in the line of fire if Putin did decide to open up a broader conflict. But I simply do not see a realistic version of events where a broader war with NATO is something that Putin can risk.
Yeah we’re not actually that far apart, if at all :)
The only way they’re going to engage in violence anyone else is if they can be confident that it won’t incur a response on the order of a NATO counterattack (or even much less). In the mainstream media this is often where the discussion stops, but it’s worth considering how Russia and the West are already engaging in actions that could be seen as acts of war: cyber-attacks, airspace incursions from Russia; boarding ships (and presumably also cyber-attacks and airspace incursions our media just doesn’t talk about) from the West. There are levels of aggression that will not be met with such a full-throated response, and Russia uses those acts to attempt to punish the West for its support of Ukraine already.
The scope exists there for more escalation, and that is where vigilance must be directed.
Gaining ground isn’t the same thing as winning, a lesson that the Russians should be all too familiar with, as it’s how they beat the Germans in WW2 (though a more accurate point of comparison would be Germany’s failure against the West in WW1; they held significant ground in France at the time of their surrender. It wasn’t that their lines collapsed or that they were outmanoeuvred on the battlefield; it was their economy that could no longer bear the weight of the war). It is, in fact, an extremely effective strategy to slowly cede ground at a cost that is too high for your aggressor to bear, and that’s exactly what Ukraine is doing to Russia. This doesn’t mean Ukraine is guaranteed to win, but their success largely depends on the continued support of their allies in Europe and North America. Whereas Russia has no real clear path to success at this point.
Russian doctrine relies on punching a hole, moving and exploiting that gap to create a salient and outmanoeuvre your enemy. Ukraine has gotten too good at entrenching, and is creating deeply layered defences that the Russians have no way to break through in a decisive fashion, and Ukraine is being extremely careful with it’s manpower, whereas Russian continues to waste theirs on pointless attacks and dispersed operations. We’re seeing constant footage and reports of Russian sections consisting of only 2-4 men attacking over open ground with no vehicle support, and getting picked off as they come in by Ukrainian machine gun positions and FPVs. The Russian economy is grinding to a halt under the weight of the war; they held out a lot longer in the face of sanctions than anyone in the West predicted, but the choices they made early on to keep the economy flowing are now turning into major pain points (massive interest rate hikes to control inflation now turning into a serious lack of investment and consumer spending, dumped foreign currency reserves used to float the rouble now leaving them with no fallback for the hard times ahead, etc). Ukraine has developed new long range attack drones that can strike deep into Russia, opening up all of their industry, and particularly their oil refining capabilities, to attack. Russia is so big that they simply cannot defend all of it from aerial attack, and Ukraine’s intel is good enough that they can continually shift their focus to wherever Russia isn’t defending.
This is why Putin is eager to talk peace now. He would love to, as you describe, stop with their current gains. That would actually constitute a win. The longer this goes on for, the worse it gets for Russia, while Ukraine can continue to hold out for as long as we continue to stand with them and keep them supplied. Their manpower losses are serious, but manageable if they continue with their current strategies, and while Russia continues to hammer their infrastructure, Ukraine has superior - and more efficient - air defence and most of their manufacturing happens outside of the country where Russia can’t hit it.
It is especially delicious how Russia’s greatest advantage in this war - their size relative to Ukraine, hence significantly higher manpower and resources than Ukraine, as well as territorial depth that let them have important military facilities beyond the range of Ukraine, has been turned by Ukraine into one of Russia’s worst strategical weaknesses.
Anywhere in Ukraine can be hit by Russia, even with shitty shit drones like Shaheed, so Ukranians adapted, plus comparativelly to Russia their’s is a smaller country hence with fewer sites of strategical value, which means having enough AA to take down most of Russia’s missiles and long-range drones is actually possible, which is why Russia’s ever larger mass attacks of late have had so much less effect than smaller attacks did at the start of the Invasion.
Meanwhile Russia’s strategically important infrastructure is all over a large country, so they would have to deploy AA to defend every individual site and they don’t have enough of the kind of AA that can successfully deal with low-flying drones (it doesn’t matter how good their coverage with longer range systems like the S-500 is when that weapon system is not suitable to deal with Cessna-152s converted into drones flying at low altitude plus each missile costs many times more than each of those drones).
In this, Ukraine’s strategy is masterful, IMHO.
Putin’s definition of peace is that the aggressor is rewarded and the international community hands Russia what it couldn’t win by force.
No arguments there.
According to whom?
According to the actual battlefield, Russian doctrine relies on throwing wave after wave of poorly trained criminals and shanghaied DPR/LPR citizens into the machine guns, artillery and drones of the Ukrainians.
Don’t get me wrong, there are massive weaknesses, and we may see Ukraine exploit them. But we aren’t seeing that translate to battlefield success. Putin hasn’t shown any eagerness to talk peace; only the same old “peace” meaning capitulation. He’s been keen on that since the beginning.
Funnily enough, experts on Russian battlefield doctrine. The ones I talked to all work in the CAF, but you’re welcome to search up your own sources on the subject. This guy was the commander of the US armed forces in Europe from 2014 to 2017, so I’d say he probably knows his stuff, and his analysis aligns with that of the experts I’ve spoken with; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-qjrYpDDWS4&t=1s
If you’re trying to understand the disconnect between their doctrine and what’s actually playing out on the battlefield, it’s surprisingly simple really. This is what happens when you have an inflexible command structure that relies exclusively on doctrine and rigid adherence to chain of command (eg, individual soldiers are basically just machines to operated by their superiors), mixed with a huge amount of institutional corruption and an unwillingness to report the basic facts of the situation on the ground because it’s politically unfavourable to admit that things aren’t going to plan. The doctrine says “Smash a hole” so they try, and fail, repeatedly to smash that hole. That leads to waves of men being thrown at targets to no effect because if you haven’t smashed the hole you can’t move on to step two, so you just keep on repeating step one.
The Russian thirst for poorly trained conscripts cannot be adequately explained by corruption and poor reporting obscuring what’s actually happening. At some point you have to accept the possibility that Putin knows what’s happening and is ok with it.
Sure, it’s possible that Russia hasn’t changed its doctrine in 3 years, but it seems unlikely. Old doctrine is obsolete on a battlefield where all movements are immediately observed and armoured vehicles are more vulnerable due to a proliferation of anti tank weapons.
But throwing cannon fodder at the guns to reveal where they are, then shooting them with something else - that never stops working as long as you have cannon fodder.
I wonder if we’re just arguing over whether this strategy is something deserving of praise, with you thinking that, since I characterise the balance favouring Russia, I think this is strategic genius? In case of that, I don’t; it’s stupid and wasteful. But it’s also working in the sense that it’s gradually pushing Ukraine back.
I’m really not sure why you feel this needs any further explanation. I’ve already covered how their doctrine is failing them, and it’s resulting in troops being pushed into the meat grinder instead. If you’re confused on some particular point, maybe try asking questions instead.
75% of battlefield kills in Ukraine are made by explosive equipped FPV suicide drones. These can attack from any position and angle, and can loiter in an area for a long time, so the notion that they’re revealing the position of enemy guns with these attacks does not hold up to the reality on the battlefield. It may be the belief of some of the commanders that that’s what they’re doing, but if so, they’re wrong.
I covered this in my first reply in this conversation. If you’re going to repeat arguments that I’ve already countered, without offering any additional counterargument or support for your claim, then I might as well try to have a debate about quantum physics with a toddler.
What you specifically said was “It is, in fact, an extremely effective strategy to slowly cede ground at a cost that is too high for your aggressor to bear” but then ignored the fact that Russia seems extremely willing to bear the cost it is paying.
Most FPV drone kills are not first strikes against moving troops. They are more often used to to prevent recovery of a disabled vehicle or to finish off someone who’s wounded. There is a first-hand account of this here but if you’re following the war and think back to videos you’ve seen of FPV kills you’ll probably recognise this.
Think of it this way then: if you can explain a phenomenon by a potential adversary as either a conscious choice or a blunder, attributing it to a blunder is risky, because you start to assume that party is incompetent.
Don’t forget the context: I replied to a comment saying that Russia could never threaten another country because it was struggling so much in Ukraine. I don’t mean that it’s “slowly winning” to mean, “I am very confident that, without other changes, Russia will win, but it will just take many years.” I mean that Russia is advancing, able to maintain an effective fighting force and remains a real threat.
There are very real reasons to think that Ukraine’s war against Russia’s oil economy will eventually provide the pressure away from the frontline that forces Russia to capitulate. But we can’t be at all confident of this; economic collapse has, as I mentioned before, been repeatedly predicted and has not yet come to pass. That doesn’t mean it won’t, but it means that confidence about Russia’s inability to threaten violence against other states is dangerously misplaced.
Ukraine’s economy is only able to maintain its effort due to massive support from its allies. But Russia has powerful allies too: it would be a foreign policy loss for China if Russia fails; China wants the same “spheres of influence” thinking that Putin does (and Trump does) to prevail internationally.
If you want to say that Russia’s slow battlefield progress is of little importance to the war in Ukraine I’d be inclined to agree with you, but if you want to stand by the original comment that Russia’s struggles in Ukraine indicate its threats must be toothless I hope I’ve explained why I disagree.
Thank you for clarifying. I think I have a better grasp of your argument now.
First, I’ll try to offer a clarification of my own; when I talk about Russia’s preference for rapid breakthrough operations, I’ve been using the term “doctrine” very specifically. What you’re describing is not doctrine, but strategy. Doctrine is neither strategy, nor tactics, but it informs and guides both. I don’t disagree that the current Russian strategy is one of disposable conscript assaults, but I suspect that strategy largely arises from the failures of their doctrine in the face of the realities of the conflict, and is not as deliberate a choice as you seem to think. I don’t think there’s really a way for either of us to be proven right here, as we’d need to be in the room with the Russian generals to say for sure.
I’ve read the linked account previously. It’s an excellent and informative read, but it’s value is deeply limited. Unfortunately, I can’t provide many of the countervailing sources that I have access to, because I’m working from direct conversations with people with significant expertise and first hand knowledge, as opposed to documentary sources. I get that that’s a claim anyone could make, and I’ll freely acknowledge that I have no way to back it up. Trust me or don’t, your call. But basically Jakub is speaking from a very limited, anecdotal view of the battlefield. His account may well be true for where he was stationed and what he was doing, but the broader statistics have shown that FPV drones have become the primary source of battlefield casualties, on both sides. This doesn’t mean they’re the primary mode of attack, per se, but they are the mode that is most consistent in creating casualties. This article from Kyiv Post covers it well, and while I don’t consider them an unbiased source, the statistics cited actually come directly from the Russian MOD, and I can’t see any value to them in lying about this; overstating the effectiveness of Ukraine’s drones would, if anything, make Russia look worse here. According to Russian figures only 20% of battlefield casualties are caused by artillery, and only 4% by small arms. This pretty directly contradicts the claims Jakub makes in his account. I think it also largely speaks to how the war has more or less become a stalemate. Attacks from both sides are limited; even the Russian “human waves” aren’t so much waves as very small groups of soldiers, as Gen. Ben Hodges describes in the video I linked earlier.
OK, so more broadly here, I think there’s actually a lot we agree on. Yes, it would be deeply foolish to see Russia as a paper tiger, and yes, regardless of where we differ on Russia’s state of play in Ukraine, the fact remains that they are certainly able to maintain an effective fighting force outside of that conflict, and would absolutely be able to prosecute additional limited conflicts (we’ll get to that in a moment) while maintaining their position in Ukraine. But there are reasons for that that I think undermine some of your argument.
Basically, the problem for Russia is that they’re not really able to fully commit to the war in Ukraine. This isn’t a “total war” for them, and Putin lacks the ability to convince the Russian public that it should be treated as one. That’s a key difference between Russia and Ukraine right now. The Ukrainian people will accept significant hardship if it means victory, because victory is the only path to survival. But for Russia, this war is Putin’s nation building project, and maybe a chance to flex a bit and show off their prowess on the world stage. The average Russian isn’t ideologically committed to the conflict, and isn’t about to accept, say, food rationing in order to win this fight. Thus, while it’s true that a significant portion of Russia’s overall military capability remains at their disposal, that’s because it is politically untenable for them to use it. Even their apparently endless manpower isn’t truly endless; conscription waves come at a significant cost, both in terms of political capital (Russian elections may be a fraud, but dictators still only rule because people allow them to, as many kings and tyrants have learned throughout history; Putin is a keen student of history and painfully aware of this fact), and in terms of the economic impact of sending a generation of young men to die in a war instead of allowing them to contribute to your workforce. These costs are growing unsustainable for Russia, and as Ukraine’s strikes on their gas refining capabilities continue to bite that will only grow worse.
While I agree that Russia could, in theory, commit significant resources to a wider conflict, there would need to be a reason for them to do so. This is why I say that Russia would have the ability to prosecute additional limited conflicts. That rules out almost every potential target they have at present; an invasion of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Poland, Turkey, or Japan would be a total war with all of NATO, and that’s a fight that they would lose. Without the ability to conjure up some existential threat that would make such a war seem completely necessary to the Russian people, there’s simply no way for Putin to move in that direction without facing down a full scale public revolt. Either in the short term or the long term it would guarantee the collapse of their government, either because NATO marches on Moscow or their own people do. I’m not saying this lightly; I have friends and loved ones who would likely be the very first in the line of fire if Putin did decide to open up a broader conflict. But I simply do not see a realistic version of events where a broader war with NATO is something that Putin can risk.
Yeah we’re not actually that far apart, if at all :)
The only way they’re going to engage in violence anyone else is if they can be confident that it won’t incur a response on the order of a NATO counterattack (or even much less). In the mainstream media this is often where the discussion stops, but it’s worth considering how Russia and the West are already engaging in actions that could be seen as acts of war: cyber-attacks, airspace incursions from Russia; boarding ships (and presumably also cyber-attacks and airspace incursions our media just doesn’t talk about) from the West. There are levels of aggression that will not be met with such a full-throated response, and Russia uses those acts to attempt to punish the West for its support of Ukraine already.
The scope exists there for more escalation, and that is where vigilance must be directed.