The only good thing is that end-to-end encrypted messaging services such as Signal are temporarily safe. However, this law fundamentally threatens encryption and citizen safety. There is something you can do about that:
The only good thing is that end-to-end encrypted messaging services such as Signal are temporarily safe. However, this law fundamentally threatens encryption and citizen safety. There is something you can do about that:
Did you read the rest of my comment?
Voluntary scanning is bad enough, but it still introduces mandatory mitigation, which may as well be the same thing as mandatory scanning in all but name.
That’s why people are still up in arms about it.
You said:
You’re right, Chat Control 2.0 will make client side scanning more difficult to avoid but it’s still just client side scanning, not breaking encryption and it’s still only specific mitigation for sharing CSAM and part of broader evaluation. Services that are not likely to be used to share CSAM will not be forced to mitigate anything. Another mitigation could simply be disabling sharing of media - text messages will not have to scanned. So we’re basically talking about checking hashes of shared media against some database in some of the services and not “permanent, mandatory scanning of everything including encrypted stuff”.
I’m not saying you have to like and support Chat Control 2.0. I’m not even saying it’s harmless legislation. Just admit it’s not about “permanent, mandatory scanning of everything including encrypted stuff”.
I did not. I responded to the comment that said that. I said that they kept bringing CC2.0 back.
I did also say that it’s specifically about scanning, but that’s indeed not entirely accurate. That’s part of it, but it’s broader than that.
Not sure what you mean by “still just”. Client side scanning just sidesteps encryption, making the encryption useless. It’s like saying “we’ll never open your posted letters in transit, but we’ll look over your shoulder while you write/read it”.
Sure, but chat apps are pretty likely, no? And authorities are allowed to adjust the risk assessments.
I mean, sure, but that doesn’t seem like a feasible solution. People’d just leave that platform. Imagine if WhatsApp blocked sending images or files.
This wouldn’t catch new CSAM though (thus not protecting children).
Ok, sorry, I see it was /u/gratux@lemmy.blahaj.zone who said it. I often lose track when people jump into conversation like that…
You’re mostly right, my whole point is that it’s more nuanced than “they will scan everything”. People like gratux simplify it, post exaggerated claims, it spreads and then everyone who thinks they know something posts “EU Is A SurvEillAnCe StAte!!!1”.
Reading Chat Control 2.0 I see a measured response to a problem. They want to fight grooming and sharing of CSAM. How can you do it? The least invasive way is to identify services where grooming and sharing of CSAM happens and then, if the risk is high, separate children from adults (age verification) and scan media client side. That really is the least they can do. Now, we can argue if grooming and CSAM is a real problem and if EU should be trying to address it (I would argue it’s not. parents should be monitoring their kids, not EU and police has tools to fight CSAM without client side scanning) but it’s definitely not an attempt to break e2e encryption and monitor all communications.
If EU is trying to introduce mass surveillance like that then they are doing shit job. Most people would be completely fine with WhatsApp scanning their media, they already post everything on Instagram. WhatpsApp actually doesn’t want to scan anything because it’s extra work for them with no gains. People who worry about those things use Signal of Matrix. Most of them would disable media sharing as a last resort. No one is going to read our text messages or decrypt our files.