The only good thing is that end-to-end encrypted messaging services such as Signal are temporarily safe. However, this law fundamentally threatens encryption and citizen safety. There is something you can do about that:

https://fightchatcontrol.eu/

  • ExLisper@lemmy.curiana.net
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    1
    arrow-down
    1
    ·
    2 hours ago

    Detection obligations have indeed been removed

    Ok, thanks. So hopefully you will stop spreading misinformation that in introduces mandatory scanning now.

    • ReluctantZen@feddit.nl
      link
      fedilink
      English
      arrow-up
      2
      ·
      edit-2
      1 hour ago

      Did you read the rest of my comment?

      Voluntary scanning is bad enough, but it still introduces mandatory mitigation, which may as well be the same thing as mandatory scanning in all but name.

      That’s why people are still up in arms about it.

      • ExLisper@lemmy.curiana.net
        link
        fedilink
        English
        arrow-up
        1
        ·
        40 minutes ago

        You said:

        They are actively working on Chat Control 2.0, the permanent, mandatory scanning of everything including encrypted stuff.

        You’re right, Chat Control 2.0 will make client side scanning more difficult to avoid but it’s still just client side scanning, not breaking encryption and it’s still only specific mitigation for sharing CSAM and part of broader evaluation. Services that are not likely to be used to share CSAM will not be forced to mitigate anything. Another mitigation could simply be disabling sharing of media - text messages will not have to scanned. So we’re basically talking about checking hashes of shared media against some database in some of the services and not “permanent, mandatory scanning of everything including encrypted stuff”.

        I’m not saying you have to like and support Chat Control 2.0. I’m not even saying it’s harmless legislation. Just admit it’s not about “permanent, mandatory scanning of everything including encrypted stuff”.

        • ReluctantZen@feddit.nl
          link
          fedilink
          English
          arrow-up
          1
          ·
          edit-2
          10 minutes ago

          You said:

          I did not. I responded to the comment that said that. I said that they kept bringing CC2.0 back.

          I did also say that it’s specifically about scanning, but that’s indeed not entirely accurate. That’s part of it, but it’s broader than that.

          but it’s still just client side scanning, not breaking encryption

          Not sure what you mean by “still just”. Client side scanning just sidesteps encryption, making the encryption useless. It’s like saying “we’ll never open your posted letters in transit, but we’ll look over your shoulder while you write/read it”.

          Services that are not likely to be used to share CSAM will not be forced to mitigate anything.

          Sure, but chat apps are pretty likely, no? And authorities are allowed to adjust the risk assessments.

          Another mitigation could simply be disabling sharing of media - text messages will not have to scanned

          I mean, sure, but that doesn’t seem like a feasible solution. People’d just leave that platform. Imagine if WhatsApp blocked sending images or files.

          So we’re basically talking about checking hashes of shared media against some database in some of the services

          This wouldn’t catch new CSAM though (thus not protecting children).